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Abstract:This article examines the writings of one of the most influential political philosophers of the 20th century, Hannah 
Arendt, and specifically focuses on her views regarding the distinction between the private and the public and the transformation 
of the public to the social by modernity. The whole of her critique on modernity is related to her reading of the politics of 
totalitarianism. For Arendt, totalitarianism was an entirely characteristic product of modernity. It is not simply that she is 
deconstructing political modernity, she is trying to re-construct the manner of politicking based on the fact of human plurality. 
What Arendt repeatedly calls for, is for us to realize the human condition of plurality as a prerequisite for constituting one’s own 
life in the world. Rather than modernity’s homogeneity, it is plurality that enables humans to appear as unique individuals instead 
of as a species of animals. Humans escape their lonely imagination and experience reality in a world that is shared with others and 
even build the world among each other. The aim of this article is to promote interest in this reading of Arendt and to show how her 
ideas especially plurality (that is, relating, experiencing and dialoguing with others) could fruitfully contribute to improving 
modern politics of representative democracy.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Hannah Arendt‘s critique of political modernity seeks to 
make genuine political experiences possible. Modernity 
claims for its legitimacy not only the triumphs of science and 
the achievements of technology, but also all citations of the 
emancipation of mankind from diseases, natural 
catastrophes, economic crises and repression-conditioned 
neurosis; the emancipation of the humiliated and 
downtrodden, the elevation of standard of living, the 
establishment of judicial fairness and democracy, the 
elimination of hunger and misery, pain and suffering – in a 
word, the emancipation from ―Evil‖. But then, all this refers 
to that which is useful to the self, which seeks satisfaction in 
itself. In the course of modern centuries, this has become the 
obvious meaning of human endeavour to such an extent that 
even the professional questioners and most philosophers 
have come to accept this criterion as self-evident and self-
legitimizing.  
However, modernity is characterised in its essence by a 
peculiar understanding of freedom, but the concept of 
freedom in general, nonetheless, is not exclusively modern. 
What we present here is Hannah Arendt‘s critique of 
modernity with particular attention to its concept of freedom 
as it affects man as a ―Homo Politicus‖ in our cotemporary 
age. Her critique of modernity, contrary to the view of her 
critics, is to show that modernity in its pursuit of the freedom 
of the absolved subject has given rise to world alienation and 
earth alienation and blurred the dividing line between the 
private realm (necessity) and the public realm (politics). 
Hence, it withdraws humanity from worldly existence, 
depriving it of authentic public reality which is a conditio 
sine qua non for authentic politics. Consequently, 
homogeneity and conformity have replaced plurality and 
freedom. Therefore, this work  shall argue in its conclusion 
that her relentless effort to clarify and secure the theoretical 
conditions for the possibility of the political against all that 
might conspire to destroy it are in the end relevant and well-
conceived.  
2. HANNAH ARENDT’S MAJOR CONCERN 
Arendt‘s concern, as anyone who is familiar with her writing 
would know, was to defend politics as the sphere within 
which the highest form of human freedom could be 
achieved. Despite appearances, ambiguities and ambivalence 
plagued modernity from the beginning; for many, the 
Enlightenment promise of freedom through the development 
of rationality resulted in disenchantment. Unintended effects 
of modernization became evident, and a cultural reaction 
against it was established by the end of the nineteenth 
century. By the late twentieth century heated theoretical 
debate was creating a decisive split between those who 
would still come to terms with modernity and those who 
pronounced a shift to post-modernity. Appalled by what she 
observed in her own Germany, she argued that totalitarian 
mass movements were an unprecedented form of terror, 
unlike any previous forms of tyranny or despotism. For 
modern totalitarianism necessitated a rethinking of the 
Enlightenment project, cast doubt on the very notion of 
scientific and technological progress, and exposed a ―radical 
evil‖ at the very centre of modernity. This is evinced in the 
modern calculative quest to dominate and reduce phenomena 
to instrumental matter to be worked upon and incorporated 
into the human project of technological mastery.  
Hannah Arendt is a theorist of ruptures, reversals and 
distinctions: ruptures within the history of the West, 
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reversals of human activities and their location, and the 
categorical distinctions necessary for their conceptual 
illumination. Nowhere is this more apparent than in The 
Human Condition, where Hannah Arendt outlines the three 
central human activities of labour, work, and action, which 
are each grounded in corresponding given ―conditions‖ of 
human existence: life, worldliness, and plurality.  
3. THE DESTRUCTION OF PUBLIC SPHERE IN MODERNITY  
The rise of the private activities of labour and work to a 
place of political dominance entails the eclipse of the public 
realm and of political action. She refers to this as the rise of 
the social, the rise of reproductive labour and a revised idea 
of natality. This account of ruptures in the history of Western 
philosophy points towards the retreat of human freedom and 
potentialities through the reduction of difference and 
plurality to the sameness and conformity of the private and 
anti-political activities of production and consumption. Her 
endeavour was not to protect the private sphere of free, 
rights-bearing, rational, autonomous agents, who engage in 
politics only so as to preserve their privacy; rather she 
critiques the modern reversal of the relative importance of 
those activities which correspond to the private realm and 
those of the public. She criticizes the public of distorting the 
distinction between the private and the public and the 
transformation of the public to the social by modernity. 
As indicated above, in her book, The Human Condition, 
Arendt describes the phenomenology of three forms of 
human activities that pertain to the ―vita activa‖ and 
corresponds to one of the basic conditions of human lifei. 
These activities are labour, work and action. She explains 
‗labour‘ as the activity which corresponds to the biological 
processes of the human body (growth, metabolism and 
decay) and whose condition is life itself. The second activity 
is ‗work‘ which provides artificial (unnatural) world of 
things outlasting and transcending individual life, whose 
human condition is worldliness.  Action is the third and the 
highest human activity and the only one that takes place 
between men without the intermediary of things. Action 
corresponds to the human condition of plurality, which is the 
conditio per quem of all political life, and can be explained 
as the possibility of a shared, collective, deliberative, active 
intervention in our fate, in what would otherwise be the by-
product of private decisions‖ii. Hannah Arendt stipulates that 
all three activities and their conditions are closely connected 
to the most general conditions of human existence: birth and 
death; natality and mortality. Along with these basic human 
activities, Arendt describes the forums with which such 
activities take place. They are specifically: the Public 
Sphere, the Private Sphere and the Social. 
4. THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The public is the political and Arendt refers to it as the locus 
in which mutual and genuine relationships between peers 
occur, corresponding to the polis life and citizenship 
characterized by freedom and individuality.
iii
 This is ―the 
place everybody needs the other in order to distinguish 
himself or herself and show in deed and word that he or she 
is unique (thereby becoming immortal) where a remedy for 
futility of action and speech is offered.‖iv Arendt explains 
that a public realm "cannot be erected for one generation and 
planned for the living only; it must transcend the life span of 
mortal men"v. And she goes on to explain, 
It is the publicity of the public realm which can absorb and 
make shine through the centuries whatever men may want to 
save from the natural ruin of time. Through many ages 
before us—but now not any more—men entered the public 
realm because they wanted something of their own or 
something they had in common with others to be more 
permanent than their earthly lives. 
Without this concern with a public realm that extends across 
history from the past into the future, what becomes of 
political action based on the common good, rather than 
private interests? 
With the loss of any concern with immortality, have we 
witnessed not merely the erosion, but the irrevocable death 
of the public realm? 
And perhaps most importantly of all, without the existence 
of a public, can there still exist, in something more than 
name only, a republic? 
There is perhaps no clearer testimony to the loss of the 
public realm in the modern age than the almost complete loss 
of authentic concern with immortality, a loss somewhat 
overshadowed by the simultaneous loss of the metaphysical 
concern with eternity." 
Hannah Arendt was one of the first to remark upon the loss 
of the public realm, or what Jürgen Habermas called the 
public sphere.  As indicated by the terms realm and sphere, 
along with related phrases such as public space and public 
sector, we are referring here to a kind of environment, or as 
Arendt puts it, "the world itself, in so far as it is common to 
all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in 
it"vi. The private realm is defined in relation (and opposition) 
to the public, but both are differentiated from the natural 
environment according to Arendt.  Both are human artifacts, 
human inventions: ―To live together in the world means 
essentially that a world of things is between those who have 
it in common, as a table is located between those who sit 
around it: the world like every in-between, relates and 
separates men at the same time‖vii 
The table is an apt metaphor, as it has the connotation of 
civilized discourse, and a willingness to sit down for 
peaceful negotiation. Indeed, it is much more than a 
metaphor, as the table does create a shared space for 
individuals, a medium, if you will, around which they can 
communicate. But the table also keeps individuals separate 
from one another, establishing a buffer zone that allows for a 
sense of safety in the company of individuals who might 
otherwise be threatening.  Sitting at a table restricts the 
possibilities of sudden movement, providing some assurance 
that the person seated across from you will not suddenly 
spring at you with sword or knife in hand, especially if both 
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parties keep their hands visible on the table top. No wonder, 
then, that as the practice of sitting around a table for a meal 
emerges in the Middle Ages, it becomes the focal point for 
what Norbert Elias refers to as the civilizing process. 
The table is a medium, an in-between, as Arendt puts it, and 
each medium in its own way serves as a means by which 
individuals connect and relate to one another, and also are 
separated and kept apart from one another. 
Arendt criticizes modern individuality on the grounds of the 
victory of ―particulars‖ in the form of process-oriented 
thinking. For Arendt, a life without public activity does not 
address the temporal problem of finitude or what she calls 
the human ―repugnance for futility.‖viii Futility (although not 
worthlessness) pertains to every activity that continues 
indefinitely without an ―end-in-itself.‖  
I argue that her work is addressed to the problem of 
sustaining distinctiveness in the face of social conformity or 
normalization. Arendt believes that individuation is gained 
through action in the face of normalization. Her temporal 
reading of activity can be fruitfully read in comparison to 
similar aspects of post-structuralist thought. She uses the 
words ―general‖ and ―universal‖ interchangeably in her 
political writings. This leads some commentators (like 
Barnouw Dagmarix and Disch Lisa Janex) to suggest that 
generality means for Arendt what is shared in a specific 
community, not the universality of a common rationality. 
5. THE PRIVATE SPHERE  
Arendt contrasts the public with the private sphere, 
corresponding to the household, governed with necessity and 
driven by wants and needs and generally by life itself.xi 
Hence, the private is the centre of vital production including 
not only economic concerns but also bodily functions and 
species reproduction.xii  Under this natural community, ―the 
labour of man to provide nourishment and the labour of the 
woman in giving birth‖ are subject to and born of the same 
necessity and urgency of life.xiii Arendt argues ―that in 
ancient times, the private sphere facilitated the hide away of 
these labourers and their laborious-devoted-to-bodily-
function lives (especially women and slaves) and their 
segregation from the community‖xiv 
The root meaning of privacy is the same as privative and 
deprived, as lacking a role in or access to the public 
arena.  For Arendt, privacy provides the space for the 
individual's thoughtful contemplation, but must serve as a 
backstage region, to use Erving Goffman's dramaturgical 
metaphor, for the staging of public action, political activity 
involving collective deliberation and cooperation. 
Underlying this is the essential point that the public and the 
private are interdependent, which is why "the barbarian," or 
member of a tribal society, has neither.  Conceptions of both 
the public and the private are tied to the nascent notion of the 
individual, of identity separate from the group, which only 
began to form following the introduction of writing and the 
advent of literacy. Writing, as Eric Havelock put it, 
"separates the knower from the known," allowing for 
objective distance from one's tradition and tribe, and from 
one's own thoughts.  This inward turn opens the door to the 
idea of the private individual, while the act of reading and 
writing itself requires a degree of isolation.  Readers read 
alone and apart from one another, even if they read the exact 
same text at the exact same time.  Listeners constitute a 
group, a collectivity, as an audience (which is a singular 
noun, whereas readers are plural).  A public then is 
dependent on the existence of the private individual, as the 
public is composed of individuals who govern themselves 
because they can think for themselves, speak their own 
minds, and deliberate as equals. Equality too is linked to 
writing, as it is with the introduction of codified law made 
possible by writing that we gain the idea that we are all equal 
in relation to the same set of rules and 
commandments.  Public and private then have their roots in 
antiquity, but do not become fully formed until the modern 
era, following the introduction of the printing press, which 
also opened the door for the modern ideology of 
individualism. 
As public and private have a common origin, so too are they 
commonly at risk due to the same forces.  Politically, 
totalitarianism seeks to remove all of the barriers that make 
private life possible, at the same time that the public sphere 
is dismantled to create a single homogenous field of power 
through surveillance.  Economically, in ancient Greece, the 
center of public life was the agora, which also served as the 
marketplace, but only a few years before Arendt published 
The Human Condition, the modern marketplace began to be 
referred to as the private sector, as corporations usurped the 
human invention of private identity, and have systemically 
undermined the last vestiges of the public sphere as they 
seek to create a single homogenous field of consumption 
through the manufacture of desire.  We might well wonder 
why corporate executives for the most part have been 
allowed to escape the heavy media scrutiny that political 
leaders and other celebrities are subjected to.   
Underlying the general blurring and dissolution of the 
private and the public that we have been experiencing is the 
electronic media environment, which has undermined, 
superseded, and short-circuited the media environment 
associated with literacy and print.  In place of individualism, 
which was based on the compartmentalization of private life 
kept separate from the public sphere, we have 
personalization, which involves providing open access to 
personal data, history, and activity, and the persona itself.  In 
the absence of boundaries, honesty becomes of the highest 
value, but it is typically the honesty of self-disclosure, 
narcissistic self-revelation in the interests of self-promotion, 
as when celebrities go on talk shows to confess to personal 
problems as part of what is, or seems to be, an image-
revitalization strategy. Openness in communication is 
treasured, even though indiscriminate openness can be 
damaging rather than healing depending on the context and 
manner in which it is approached.  Transparency is put forth 
as a basic principle, and while awareness that we are being 
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observed generally results in more ethical behavior than 
would otherwise occur, there are times when some amount 
of secrecy in politics is needed for successful negotiation. 
6. THE SOCIAL  
The emergence of society—the rise of housekeeping, its 
activities, problems, and organizational devices—from the 
shadowy interior of the household into the light of the public 
sphere, has not only blurred the old borderline between 
private and political, it has also changed almost beyond 
recognition the meaning of the two terms and their 
significance for the life of the individual and the citizen. Not 
only would we not agree with the Greeks that a life spent in 
the privacy of "one's own" (idion), outside the world of the 
common, is "idiotic" by definition, or with the Romans to 
whom privacy offered but a temporary refuge from the 
business of the res publica; we call private today a sphere of 
intimacy whose beginnings we may be able to trace back to 
late Roman antiquity, though hardly to any period of Greek 
antiquity, but whose peculiar manifoldness and variety were 
certainly unknown to any period prior to the modern age. 
According to Arendt, ―the emergency of the modern age and 
especially the enrichment of the  private sphere and the rise 
of  a modern concept of privacy (initiated by Rousseau‘s 
theory of individuality), which in contrast to the ancient 
understanding was  not understood as deprivation but as the 
shelter of intimacy, there emerged a third realm, the social, 
which is neither private nor public and whose function was 
to stand against the private and yet be different from the 
public,‖xv although representing the collective and the 
impersonal, the social realm is characterized by conformism, 
demanding ―that its members act as though they were 
members of one enormous family which has only one 
opinion and one interest‖ and expecting from them ―a certain 
kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, 
all which tend to ‗normalise‘  its  members to make them 
behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding 
achievement.‖xvi 
This modern monolithic type of society and its conformism 
allows for only one interest and one opinion and is rooted in 
the ―one-ness of man-kind.‖xvii According to D‘ entreves, 
Arendt‘s idea of one-ness, represented by the social, makes 
our identities precarious and our realities more doubtful, as 
we can no longer provide a coherent narrative  about who we 
really are.xviii Although the public is that which allows for the 
expression of the very self, the rise of the social realm 
banished action and speech (as a means to express oneself) 
into the sphere of the intimate and the private.‖xix Arendt 
remarks that the rise of the social is accompanied by a very 
strong form of social control whereby members are being 
homogenised, levelled and their behaviour, rather than 
action, ―normalised‖. 
One of Arendt‘s most important contributions concerns her 
idea of appearance. In her words, 
Without a space of appearance and without 
trusting in action and speech as a mode of 
being together, neither the reality of one‘s 
self, of one‘s own identity, nor the reality 
of the surrounding world can be 
established beyond doubt. The human 
sense of reality demands that men actualise 
the sheer passive given-ness of their being, 
not in order to change it but in order to 
make articulate and call into full existence 
what otherwise they would have to suffer 
passively anyhow. This actualisation 
resides and comes to pass in those 
activities that exist only in sheer activity.xx 
But homogeneity and subordination to social norms reaffirm 
what she coined as ―the loss of appearance‖, namely the 
making of members of the society conform to external norms 
and expectations, thereby violating their action and sense of 
reality and consequently incur world alienation.  
7. MODERNITY AND ALIENATION 
The emergency of the social led to the condition that Arendt 
calls ―world alienation‖. This is the bestowal of subjectivity 
with the power to determine reality at the cost of making 
reality a purely private matter. Hence, with the help of 
modernity, the social realm conquered the public realm, 
replacing action with behaviour, reserving the public realm 
to serve as the only place where men could show who they 
really and inexchangeably were.‖xxi In Arendt‘s view, 
―modernity and the new age have permitted the abstraction 
of man from his created world by his preoccupation with 
science to conquer nature and left the political space to the 
ravages of untamed necessity.‖xxii This situation resulted in 
the victory of animal laborans over homo faber and the 
eclipse of the distinction between the private and the public, 
between economy and polity, between oikos and polisxxiii 
Consequently, Arendt advocates for the recognition of the 
intrinsic value of the public realm and more generally the 
recovery and revitalization of that realm. The recovery of the 
public lost in modernity is an attempt to save the modern 
world from its growing futility and from its great emphasis 
on labour and consumption. It is an attempt to remind us of 
those values and activities that enable us to share the world 
(rather than the life) we live in common. In all, Arendt sees 
in modernity the evolvement of the social sphere with its 
requirement of social conformism and the idea of oneness, 
the loss of appearance and the inability to be seen and act 
freely.  
8. WORLD ALIENATION: FIRST STAGE OF MODERNITY 
We would say that Arendt defends the uncommon claim that 
people in modernity are alienated from the world. This is 
uncommon in the sense that most of us find secularization, 
utilitarianism, consumerism, materialism, science, 
technology and so on characteristic of this time and, in these 
words, the concentration on life‘s daily worries and 
pleasures is reflected in a number of different ways. The 
crucial question then is: what has she in mind when she 
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speaks of modernity‘s alienation of the world? This we shall 
discover as we progress. In view, alienation has confronted 
man from different angles: philosophical, political and 
economic and the worst of all is world alienation, which 
marooned man in the island of instrument amidst the ocean 
of the members of the species of mankind. There his 
cherished companion is loneliness. 
The world and its correlative condition, 
worldliness are part of what Arendt 
considers to be the condition. In 
contradistinction to nature, the world is the 
artificial environment of humanly created 
objects, institutions, and settings that 
provides with an abode upon this earth, 
with a shelter from natural elements, and 
insofar as it is relatively stable and 
permanent, with a sense of belonging, of 
being at home with our surroundings.xxiv 
World in her idiom is a typical human construction and is 
contracted with the cyclical natural process of rising, shining 
and decaying. Pieter Tijmes stresses the point when he says, 
―when Hannah Arendt speaks about the world, it is not 
physical world she refers to. Her concept of world separates 
human beings from and protects them against nature.‖xxv 
Man is naturally artificial. According to Arendt, not the 
natural, but the artificial is specifically human. ―civilization 
gives man the opportunity to transcend the animal species 
and consists precisely in building a world: a world of 
ploughed fields, roads and hedges instead of a wild 
landscape: a world of building instead of the open air, a 
world of language and culture, of communities and 
traditions, a world of art, law, religion and all the rest of the 
man-made things that outlive the men who made them and 
form the inheritance of human race‖xxvi. Certainly, this 
creation is more permanent than the individual and 
represents some certain stability for him. Each new 
generation inherits this specifically human and relatively 
stable context and adds her part of the cultural wed that she 
hands down to the next generation. 
It is obvious that without such a stable human world, our 
lives would lack points of reference by which to orient us. 
Our identities would be difficult to sustain, and our actions 
would not form coherent stories. Instead, we will be part of 
the endless cycles of nature, part of the endless flux. But we 
find out that the world provides us with a touchstone of 
reality. And since it is lived in common with others, our 
experience can become objective by being shared, our senses 
can be confirmed by the testimony of others, and our self-
identity can be sustained by intersubjective 
acknowledgement. ―The reality of the world and of the self 
can thus be secured only by sharing our existence with 
others, that is, by living in a world which is public and 
common‖xxvii 
But the question is: what happens then when this world is 
lost? That is when we find ourselves in that unfortunate 
condition that Arendt calls world alienation. ―The first and 
most important consequence would be that we lose our sense 
of being at home in the world and with that, our identity, our 
sense of reality, and the possibility of endowing our 
existence with meaning.‖xxviii So, in order to live meaningful 
lives, our human environment must present certain features 
(e.g. relative familiarity, stability, permanence) that enable 
our expectation to be satisfied in a non-random manner. 
Another consequence of the world alienation is that, lacking 
a world in common, the individual is thrown back upon 
himself into private sphere of introspection which, being 
devoid of agreed-upon standards, can never provide secure 
principle of conduct. Moreover, being thrown back upon 
ourselves means also losing ourselves, losing the faith in our 
senses and, ultimately, in our reason, a condition that Arendt 
insists on calling world alienation, though it might well be 
defined as self-alienation. The result is that, alienated from 
ourselves and from others, we become doubtful of our 
experiences and of the reality of the world.xxix  
These extreme developments are also encouraged by another 
serious phenomenon arising from ―world alienation‖: 
restriction or elimination of the public sphere (which we 
shall treat in much detail in the later chapters), the sphere of 
appearance, where the words and the deeds of the individual 
can be preserved for posterity and identity of each disclosed 
and sustained. Being at home in the world is in fact one of 
the pre-conditions for the constitution of a public realm. 
With the loss of the world, framework for public activities 
can never come into being, nor can those capacities that 
flourished within it such as judgement, common sense, 
impartiality, and memory. Arendt‘s analysis is determined 
by her desire to preserve the autonomy of action from 
instrumentalising attitude of homo faber. She puts forward 
two main causes of world alienation as expropriation and 
wealth accumulation.  
9. EARTH ALIENATION: THE SECOND STAGE OF 
MODERNITY  
While world alienation determined the sense and the 
development of modern society, earth alienation became and 
remained the hallmark of modern science. It represents an 
intensification of the trends identified with world alienation. 
It was partly induced by the discovery of America and the 
subsequent exploration of the whole earth, culminating in the 
invention of the airplane and in the conquest of space. This 
had the unintended effect of making the earth seem much 
smaller to the point where modern man could see it as mere 
ball from which he could detach himself and view it from a 
point in space. She introduces this theme by a discussion of 
Rene Descartes‘ method of doubt and of Copernicus and 
Galileo‘s ―alienation‖ of the earth, their dislocation of it, 
from their imaginary Archimedean point beyond it. She 
quotes Copernicus‘s words about ―the virile man standing in 
the sun…overlooking the planets‖ and seeing the earth move 
with them. She unequivocally takes Descartes‘ doubt and his 
thoughts about himself as a thinker, as much as his 
analytical-geometrical physics as expressions of this 
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alienation of the familiar world brought about by the new 
science. Whitehead is also quoted as likening the new 
sciences‘ beginnings in the discovery of telescope and in 
Galileo‘s use of it to ―a babe…born in a manger,‖xxx a great 
happening with little stir. Going further, she adds: 
―Like the birth in the manger, which 
spelled not the end of antiquity but the 
beginning of something so unexpectedly 
and unpredictably new that neither hope 
nor fear could have anticipated it, these 
first tentative glances into the universe 
through an instrument, at once adjusted to 
human senses and destined to uncover 
what definitely and forever must lie 
beyond them, set the stage for an entirely 
new world‖xxxi 
The proximate cause however was the invention of the 
telescope, which besides destroying man‘s faith in the 
evidence of the senses established an Archimedean 
standpoint from which the earth could be viewed as part of 
an infinite universe.   
10. CONCLUSION  
 Reflecting on the supremely important thought that Hannah 
Arendt has given us in her critique of modernity, we can say 
that her philosophy ignites a renewed appreciation for human 
worldliness and plurality that is incomparable in 
contemporary political thought. In a world like ours where, 
in some countries, religion has become political, and politics 
religion, in a world where the protectors of the citizens and 
the ‗city walls‘ have decided to be protected rather than to 
protect, living the commoners at the mercy of insecurity, in a 
world where custodians of people‘s resources have decided 
to embezzle and enrich themselves in the name of leadership, 
in a world where, through decrees, men are forced and 
compelled to undergo pain, in a world where the 
representative of citizens have decided to represent their 
personal opinions in public issues rather than that of the 
masses all in the name of modern representative democracy, 
the relevance of Arendt‘s critique of modernity remains 
indisputably unquestionable. 
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